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iii.

IN THE SUPRE!IB COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION,

)

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

v.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 14833

)
)

STERLING A. MEYER and
JEANNE D. MEYER et ux.,
REESE HO\VELL, ESCROW AGENT
and TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY,
Defendants and
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for declaratory relief wherein Plaintiff
seeks to have the Utah Statutory Dower provision,

§

74-4-3

Utah Code Annotated (1953), declared unconstitutional, both on
its face and applied to the case at hand.

1.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants' Motion for SWTu-:iary Judgment in their favor
was granted and an Order to that effect entered by the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County on
October 20, 1976.

From the Order granting Summary Judgment,

the Plaintiff appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Summary Judgment and
judgment in its favor as a matter of law, on the ground tl~
the Utah Statutory Dower provision, § 74-4-3 Utah Code Anootated

(1953) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On or about November 1, 1973, Appellant, Plaintiff

below, obtained a judgment from the Third Judicial District
Court, Civil No. 210940, against nespondent, Defendant below,
Sterling A. Meyer in the sum of $19,158.12.

Respondent

Jeanne D. Meyer, the wife of Sterling A. Meyer was not a party
to that suit or judgment.

2.

At the time judgnent was entered, Respondents Sterlin:

A. and Jeanne D. Meyer were the fee simple and/or benefic~l
owners, as joint tenants, of a certain parcel of real proper t'1

2.
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with a personal residence situated thereon, located at 176l
South 2600 East, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
3.

In accordance with § 78-22-1 Utah Code Annotated

(1953), upon docketing, said judgment became a lien upon all
the real property owned by the Respondent Sterling A. Meyer
located in Salt Lake County, including the parcel described
above.
4.

On or about March 2, 1976, Respondents Sterling A.

and Jeanne D. Meyer sold the above-described residence and
placed the proceeds from the sale in escrow with the Respondents Title Insurance Agency of Salt Lake City and Reese
Howell as Escrow Agent.
5.

The Appellant thereafter served a Writ of Execution

upon Respondents Title Insurance Agency and Howell, directing
them to release said proceeds to Appellant.
6.

Respondents and each of them do not dispute that

Appellant Boise Cascade Corporation is entitled by law to
execute upon Respondent Sterling A. Meyer's 50 per cent share
of the proceeds from the sale of the subject property and
Appellant asserts no claim against Respondent Jeanne D. Meyer's
50 per cent share of the proceeds from the sale of the subject
property.
7.

Subsequent to the issuance of the Writ of Execution,

Respondents and each of them refused to surrender up one-third

3.
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of Respondent Sterling A. Meyer's 50 per cent share of the
proceeds from the sale of the subject property, on the

ground
that said one-third represented Jeanne D. M
•
·eyer s statutory
dower under § 74-4-3 Utah Code Annotated.
8.

Therefore, the sole and exclusive issue before the

trial court and this Court is whether

§

74-4-3 is consti~-

tional, thus allowing Respondents to withhold the above onethird share from execution by Appellant.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A TOTALLY NEW CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW HAS EMERGED IN
THE LAST FIVE YEARS RENDERING ALL STATUTORY PROVISIONS

RESULT-

ING IN DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUALS BASED UPON SEX TO BE
VOID UNLESS SUPPORTED BY STRONG, COMPELLING AND LEGITIMATE
JUSTIFICATION.
The sole and single issue presented to the Court on this
Petition for Appeal is whether

§

74-4-3 Utah Code Annotated

(1953), as amended, generically known as Utah's statutory
dower provision is unconstitutional per se or unconstitutional
as applied.

The statute in question provides as follows:

74-4-3. WIFE'S INTEREST IN HUSBAND'S REAL PROPERTY.
One-third in value of all the legal or equitable
estates in real property possessed by the husba~d
at any time during the marriage, to which the wife
has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be
set apart as her property in fee s~mple, if she
survives him; provided, that the wife shall not be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4.

entitled to any interest under the provisions of
this section in any such estate of which the husband has made a conveyance when the wife, at the
time of the conveyance, was not and never had been
a resident of the territory or state of Utah.
Property distributed under the provisions of this
section shall be free from all debts of the decedent except those secured by liens for work or
labor done or material furnished exclusively for
the improvement of the same, and except those
created for the purchase thereof, and for taxes
levied thereon. The value of such part of the
homestead as may be set aside to the widow shall
be deducted from the distributive share provided
for her in this section.
In cases wherein only
the heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent
are interested, the property secured to the widow
by this section may be set off by the court in
due process of administration.
[Emphasis added.]
The statute clearly establishes a real property interest in a
certain class of individuals based upon sex and sex alone.
The statute here under examination creates a special property
interest for females, takes away a certain real property
interest from males and creates no similar or corresponding
interest for males.
The gravamen of Plaintiff's Appeal is founded upon the
discriminatory treatment of

a

special classification of

individuals which bears no rational nexus to any legitimate
state interest.

Such a statutory scheme has been ruled

unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in a
string of developing case authority commencing with the now
famous or infamous case of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct.
251, 30 L.Ed. 2d 225 (1971) and culminating most recently in
Craig et. al. v. Boren, 45 Law Week 4057 (Dec. 20, 1976).

5.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The United States Supreme Court has held that stQtutory
classifications based on sex were "inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny."
411 U.S.

677,

thu;

Fronterio v. Richardsoc,

93 S. Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.

2d 583

(1973).

It is Plaintiff's contention that the Utah statutory dow;:
provision is violative of Due Process and Equal Protection a~
therefore repugnant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States as well as Article I,
Section 7 and Article IV, Section l of the Constitution of
the State of Utah.

The following decisional authority lends

direct support to that proposition:

Reed v. Reed, supra;

Fronterio v. Richardson, supra; Stanley v.
645,

92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.

2d 551 (1972); Pittsburg Press v.

The Commission, 413 U.S. 3761
699

93 S. Ct.

(1973); Geduldig v. Aiello,

256, 94 S. Ct.
L.Ed.
U.S.

2485

Wiesenfeld,

417 U.S.

2553, 37 L.Ed. 2d
484,

41 L.Ed. 2d

(1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 40

2d 189, 94 S. Ct. 1734
31, 42 L.Ed.

Illinois, 405 U.S.

(1974); Daniel v. Louisiana, 420

2d 790, 95 S. Ct. 704

420 U.S.

636, 43 L.Ed.

(1975); Weinberger v. '

2d 514, 95 S. Ct. 1225

(1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 43 L.Ed. 2d 688, 95

s.

ct. 1373

S. Ct.

692,

(1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95
42 L.E d .

Employment Security,
181

2d 690

(1975); Turner v. Department of

423 U.S. 44, 96 S. Ct.

(1975); Chandlier v. Roudebush,

1949,, 48 L.Ed.

2d 416

U.S.

249, 46 L.Ed. 2a
98 S. Ct.

(1976); Craig v. Boren, 45 L.W. 40

December 20, 1976.
6.
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•

The fountain head case of Reed v. Reed decided in
November 1971, was truly a landmark decision in the sense
that al though the holding seemed

innocuous enough at the time,

it pressaged a spectacular development of constitutional law
not seen since the Slaughter House Cases of 18721.
The judicial development of the anti-sex discrimination
doctrine announced in Reed is somewhat analogous to the
erosion of the "privity of contract" doctrine in area of
product liability beginning with McPhearson v. Buick, 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) and culminating in an entirely new
cause of action not previously existant.

See Prosser, THE

ASSAULT UPON THE CITADEL, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960), and Prosser,
THE FALL OF THE CITADEL, 78 YALE L.J. 1066 (1969).

So it is

with the sex discrimination cases; they have laid to rest some
of the ernstwhile "archaic and overbroad generalizations"2
concerning the sexes and created an entirely new concept in
constitutional rights heretofore totally nonexistent.
Reed itself was concerned only with an Idaho probate
statute giving preference to males over females in granting
letters of administration.

The court found even a preference

to be irrational and therefore unconstitutional as a denial of
both Due Process and Equal Protection.

y

16 ~vall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1872)

?./

45 Law Week 4059; Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975)

7.
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Reed was not thereafter confined to its facts.

The

following year in Frontiero v. Ric~ardso~, supra, the court
held that an army nurse's husband could not constitutionally
be treated differently as a dependent than a male army o f ficer',
wife.

The Frontiero decision was important as it established

sex as a suspect classification along with race, religion,

a~

national origin.
In Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, the Supreme Court held the
systematic exclusion of women from jury duty to be violative
of inter alia the Equal Protection of the law.
Later in 1975 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, the high
Court held the Social Security Act's provision allowing survivors benefits to widow mothers with minor children, but not
to widower fathers in the same situation was held violative
of both Due Process and Equal Protection.
In Stanton v. Stanton, supra, a 1975 case from Utah, a
statute compelling a divorced father to support his male chiN
to age 21 while permitting the father to terminate support for '
his female child at age 18 was held to be an unlawful denial
of Equal Protection.
A second case from Utah Turner v. Department of Employment
Security, supra, decided in 1975, held a Utah statute making
pregnant women ineligible for unemployment benefits for a
period from 12 weeks before expected date of child birth until
6 weeks after child birth to be violative of Due Process.

8.
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Most recently in Craig v. Boren, supra, the u.s. supreme
Court struck down an Oklahoma state statute differentiating
between males and females in the purchase of 3.2% beer holding
the act did not "substantially further important governmental
interests"and was therefore violative of equal protection.
The foregoing summary is not exhaustive, but touches
only upon some of the more significant decisions.

A quick

review of their holdings, however, makes it clear that the
"Equal Rights Amendment" may already be in existency by judicial fiat and that the frenetic efforts of the E.R.A. proponents may be superfluous.
Clearly one conclusion can be drawn from a collective
reading of the above-cited cases, that being a statutory scheme
drawing a distinction between classes of citizens based only
on gender without strong justification cannot meet constitutional
muster and must therefore be set aside.

POINT II
UTAH'S STATUTORY DOWER PROVISION

§

74-4-3, UTAH

CODE ANNOTATED (1953), AS PRESENTLY CONSTRUED BY THE COURTS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH AS GRANTING A FEMALE A PROPERTY INTEREST
IN THE REAL PROPERTY OWNED BY A MALE, WITHOUT PROVIDING FOR A
CORRESPONDING INTEREST FOR THE MALE IN THE PROPERTY OF THE
FEMALE, CREATES A STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEX AND
SEX ALONE, CONSTITUTES A "SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION" NOT SUPPORTED

9.
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BY ANY COMPELLING STATE INTEREST A01D IS, THEREFORE, VIOLATIVE
OF THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE FIFTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, AS WELL AS ARTICLE IV, SECTION I OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTrlH.
Turning now to the Utah Statute here challenged §74-4-3,
set forth completely at page 4 supra this brief, the section
clearly creates a gender based classification.

It is now a

well-settled principle of constitutional law that "classifica-'
tions based on sex are inherently suspect and thus subject ~
the close and strict scrutiny" of the courts.

The United

States Supreme Court, in Frontiero v. Richard son, supra, while
striking down a statutory provision which allowed increased
benefits to a male member of the armed services with dependents
but disallowing similar benefits for a female member with
dependents, held per Justice Brennan:
With these considerations in mind, we can only
conclude that classifications based upon sex,
like classifications based upon race, alienage,
or national origin, are inherently suspect, and
must therefore be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny. Applying the analysis mandated by
that stricter standard of review, it is clear
that the statutory scheme now before us is
constitutionally invalid.
411 U.S. at 688.
[Emphasis added].
Equally settled in constitutional law is that in order
for a suspect classification, here one based solely on sex,
to withstand strict judicial scrutiny, it must be shown that
the state has a compelling interest to protect by the statutory

10.
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...

classification.

See

e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394

u. s.

618, 22 L.Ed. 2d 600, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969).
In the case at bar it cannot be doubted that § 74-4-3
creates a classi£ication based on sex alone.

In a very real

way the statute commands "dissimilar treatment for men and
women who
It

are . . . similarly situated."

Reed v. Reed, supra.

further cannot be disputed that the state is without a

compelling state interest which it is protecting by the statute.
The statutory dower provision is a classic and paradigm example
of the codification of "archaic and overbroad generalizations"
which are now constitutionally impermissible.

The original ver-

sion of §74-4-3 stems of course from ancient English common law,
was first enacted in Utah in 1898 and has remained essentially
unchanged since that day.
88 P. 20 (1906).

See Hilton v. Thatcher, 31 Utah 360

The provision was enacted in a day when

women were looked on with an attitude of, as Justice Brennan
stated it, "romantic paternalism."
684.

See Frontiero, supra, at

At that stage of society's development women commonly

did not have separate property or separate means of support,
insurance benefits, social security or pension and profit
sharing programs.

Whereas, today women are just as likely to

be able to support and maintain themselves as are men.

More-

over, the conclusion that § 74-4-3 is violative of both the
United states and the Utah Constitution is not only supported
but practically inescapable under the following case authority
in addition to those cases discussed above.

Stanton v. Stanton,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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11.

421 U.S.

7,

43 L.Ed.

2d 688,

95 S. Ct. 1373

(1975); W · b

v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 43 L.Ed. 2d 514, 95
(1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
95 S. Ct.
2d 256,

572

~

Ct.

1225

498, 42 L.Ed. 2d

610

,

(1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 41 L.EG

94 S. Ct. 2485

(1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351,

40 L.Ed.

2d 189, 94 S. Ct. 1734

Pa.

360 A.

,

s.

2d.

603

(1974); Adoption of Walker,

(1976).

POINT III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE, IT
IS CLEAR THAT § 74-4-3 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO THE
CASE AT HAND.
The facts of the instant case show that the property to
which Respondent Jeanne D. Meyer asserts her one-third dower
interest was sold by both herself and her husband.

By so doinc

each party relinquished any and all rights he or she had to thE
property.

It is further undisputed that Respondent Sterling A.

Meyer, the husband of Jeanne is presently alive.

Under this

set of facts i t is clear that § 74-4-3 does not and was never
intended to allow the wife to withhold one-third of the husband
portion of the proceeds from the sale in which both spouses joi
The statute clearly sets forth two conditions which must
be met before the wife can claim her one-third interest.
§

74-4-3 reads,

in pertinent part:

12.
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Secti

One-thir~ in value of all the legal or equitable
estates ~n real property possessed by the husband
at any time during the marriage, to which the wife
has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be
set ~part ~s her property in fee simple, if she
survives him . . . . (Emphasis added.)
The first condition precedent to the wife's taking onethird is that she has not relinquished her rights to said
property.

In the case at hand, Respondent Jeanne Meyer has

joined in a sale of said property to a third party.

A more

thorough and complete relinquishment of her dower rights can
hardly be imagined.
259 P. 2d 595,

In In re ~adsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327,

(1953) this court held that where a woman had

joined in a contract for the sale of land owned by her husband,
she had thereby "relinquished her inchoate right of dower in
the real property covered by that contract."
603.

259 P. 2d at

See also In re Estate of Willson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499

P. 2d 1298 (1972).
In addition, the statute requires that the wife survive
the husband, before she is permitted to take her one-third
portion.

The fact of survival of the wife as a condition

precedent to taking under § 74-4-3 is an established rule of
law in Utah.

In the seminal case of Gee v. Baum, 58 Utah

445, 199 Pac. 680, 683 (1921) the court stated unequivocally:
While it is true that under our statute dower by that
name is abolished and the wife takes one-third of her
husband's real estate in fee if she survives him, yet
unless she does survive him, she has no interest in
his real estate. The interest of the wife, although
in fee is nevertheless, a mere inchoate interest,
and de~end~ entirely upon t~e.cond~tion_th~t she
survive her husband.
In joining with ~im in a deed
of lands to which he holds the legal title she therefore merely releases her inchoate right . . . ·
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13.

Finally, it is equally well established in the Utah law
on dower interests that the interest of the wife is only in
the real property itself and not in the proceeds from any sale
or other disposition of the property.

The landmark case enunci-

ating this rule is In re Park's Estate, 31 Utah 255, 87 Pac.
900 (1906).

There the wife attempted to retain one-third of

her deceased husband's estate, clai~ing that he had conveyed
certain property away to which she had not relinquished her
dower interest.

The Court, in affirming the trial court, ~N

that the wife's only interest was in the real property itself
and not in the proceeds from the husband's general estate.

~t.

Court stated:
We . •
feel constrained to hold that the wife,
if she desires to recover her interest in her
husband's lands alienated by him during marriage,
without her consent, must resort to the lands
themselves .
The interest of the wife is in
the land itself to be apportioned to her one-third
in value out of each parcel.
87 Pac. at 903.
In the case at hand, Respondent Jeanne D. Meyer is not
seeking her one-third from the land itself, but is seeking her
one-third from the proceeds from the land.

This,under Park,

she is not permitted to do.
The conclusion is inescapable.

Not only did Respondent

Jeanne Meyer relinquish her inchoate dower right by joining
with her husband in a conveyance of the property to a third
party, but she has not yet met the requirement of survival a~
she is seeking her dower from proceeds, not real property.

14.
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This being so, §74-4-3 is not authority for the withholding,
by Respondents, of one-third of the husband's share of the
proceeds.

The application by the court below, of §74-4-3 to

the facts of the case at hand clearly amounts to a denial of due
process and renders the statute unconstitutional as applied.
CmiCLUSION
The case before the court on this appeal is not rendered
moot because the Utah State Legislature has repealed the
statutory dower provision with the adoption of the New Uniform
Probate Code, as the new Probate Code does not take effect
until July, 1977, and does not have retroactive application.

The

case before the court is important because it is a test case for
a number of other similar cases where a debtor attempts to use the
Dower Statute as a shield or defense from recovery of judgment
by the husband's creditors.

For this reason, the constitutional

question here presented remains and is in great need of clarification.
Simply stated, Utah's Statutory Dower Provision, §74-4-3, Utah
Code Annotated (1953) creates a suspect classification based on sex
which is not supportable by any compelling state interest and
must therefore be held unconstitutional.

The Summary

Judgment granted by the court below, in favor of Appellees
should be reversed and judgment entered, as a matter of law.

15.
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ih favor of Appellants.

Finally the statute in this case has

been applied to living parties where the wife herself has joine~
in the conveyance, such an application is irrational and not
related to any legitimate state purpose as the dower right is
inchoate and cannot take effect until the husband's death, and
completely abrogated by her signature on the deed.

j;

The court's

application of the statute to the facts present in the instant
case lacks logical nexus and constitutes a denial of Due Process
I

and the statute, even if constitutional on its face, is here

u~

stitutional as applied.

D

NE R. SMIT
of and for
WATKISS & CA..~PBELL
Twelfth Floor, 310 South Main St:
salt Lake City, Utah
84110
Admitted by Motion for the
purpose of this case only.

Attorneys for BOISE CASCADE CORP~
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